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EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL
SECURITY OFFSET TO WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION BENEFICIARIES
After perhaps a lifetime of paying Social Security taxes, many tax-
payers may consider the proceeds they may eventually receive simply
as a return of past contributions. Despite popular sentiment, the
Supreme Court of the United States considers the payments to be
much less certain. In Richardson v. Belcher' the Court denied that
Social Security disability benefits were accrued property rights. The
Court also upheld a statute which, in certain instances, reduces Social
Security payments to those beneficiaries who receive supplemental
income from state workmen's compensation programs; the enactment
was found constitutional despite the fact that the statute does not
similarly offset the Social Security payments of individuals who
receive funds from sources with purposes comparable to workmen's
compensation.
In March 1968, Raymond Belcher broke his neck while employed
by a company which participated in West Virginia's state workmen's
compensation program. - After meeting statutory requirements, 3 he
began receiving monthly payments of $203.60 from the fund. Federal
Social Security disability insurance benefits4 were granted beginning
in October 1968, 5 in the amount of $329.70 per month, but in Jan-
uary 1969, the allowance was reduced to $225.30 pursuant to the
offset provision of section 224 of the Social Security Act.6 Section 224
provides that federal benefits will be withheld to the extent that the
combined workmen's compensation and Social Security disability
payments exceed 80 per cent of the worker's previous average current
earnings.7
1. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
2. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23 (1970).
3. Id. § 23-4-1.
4. Social Security Act § 223, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) (2) (1970) provides for a six-month waiting period
before benefits become payable.
6. Social Security Act § 224, 42 U.S.C. § 424(a) (1970).
7. Id.
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An offset is a device used to coordinate payments from various
assistance sources to effectuate the policy of avoiding excessive com-
pensation to an individual. When total payment exceeds that level
considered advisable by policy, an offset reduces the stipend from one
or more sources of benefits to stabilize total assistance at what is
declared to be the appropriate level. Despite policy considerations,
an offset would not be permitted if the legislative scheme were not
constitutionally acceptable.
One commentator has suggested that Social Security and workmen's
compensation are elements of an unarticulated federal-state arrange-
ment meant to protect workers from wage losses caused by disabling
injuries.3 The object of the "system" is to provide the worker with
an income approximating that of his pre-disability level. Incomplete
protection under either program alone reveals a "supplementation
approach":
It is generally felt that public insurance programs, particularly
Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, should
provide basic protection against the major or catastrophic
hazards to work income (such as permanent and total disability),
and that supplemental protection should be provided by public
assistance programs [such as workmen's compensation] and by
private insurance. 9
Conceptually, the "supplemental" workmen's compensation is regarded
as compensation for that decrease in earning power which is due to a
disabling injury.'0 Payments are received as a substitute for a com-
mon law tort action," with the amount of the benefits being modest
in consideration for the certainty of the recovery and the avoidance of
litigation expenses.
The Social Security offset devised by Congress reflected a decision
to eliminate the amount by which an individual's Social Security
and workmen's compensation payments exceed 80 per cent of his pre-
disability average earnings. 2 By specifying only workmen's compen-
8. 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORXMEN'S COMPENSATION 508.172 (1971).
9. Abraham & Wolkstein, Workmen's Compensation and the Social Security
Disability Program: A Contrast, 16 VAND. L. REv. 1055, 1060 (1963).
10. E. BiAm, REFERENCE GUME TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw 1-2,11-1 (1971).
11. Id. at 1-1.
12. Social Security Act § 224, 42 U.S.C. § 424(a) (1970).
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sation as a payment which would justify offset-reduction of Social
Security benefits, Congress effectively permitted any amount of
private insurance or tort claim proceeds to be received by an individ-
ual without offset treatment. 13
The primary disagreement in Belcher between the majority and the
dissents was with respect to the constitutionality of the statutory clas-
sification. The scheme reduced the federal benefits of those recipients
who concurrently received workmen's compensation but did not re-
duce the Social Security payments of those similarly situated and re-
ceiving other benefits. The equal protection approaches taken by the
separate opinions were indicative of the different judicial philosophies
now represented on the Supreme Court. The majority's traditional
review did not expose the inconsistencies of the statute which were
discovered by the dissenters who advocated more active judicial review.
The Court's standard for review of social welfare legislation was
whether the statute was "rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination,"' 4 quoting the 1970 case of Dandridge v. Williams. s
Justices Marshall and Brennan totally disagreed with the Dandridge
test, stating that since the funds denied Belcher by the Social Security
offset were of great importance to the recipient, the judicial review
should go beyond rationality to scrutinize "'the character of the classi-
fication in question, the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do
not receive, and the asserted state [or federal] interests in support of
the classification.' ,,11
The emphasis of Dandrige and the Belcher majority on "ration-
ality" is a manifestation of the Supreme Court's recently renewed
13. One commentator has suggested that workmen's compensation is an element
of the disability coverage scheme, properly subject to an offset, while tort claims
are not. "[T]ort litigation is an adversary contest to right a wrong between the
contestants; workmen's compensation is a system, to supply security to injured
workers and distribute the cost to the consumers of the products." 1 A. LaSON,
mupra note 8, at 14. One might question the distinction for the purpose of an
offset, however: (a) the employee must waive possible tort claims to be able to
participate in workmen's compensation; (b) tort damages may include compen-
sation for loss of earning power, in which case that portion of the tort award
serves the same purpose as workmen's compensation. That part of a "system" sub-
stitutes for a "contest" does not alter a common purpose and effect of both-
compensation to the individual for wages lost due to his disability.
14. 404 U.S. at 81.
15. 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
16. 404 U.S. at 90 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
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sensitivity to the doctrines of separation of powers and judicial
restraint. A court is limited only by its theory of restraint and the
bounds of its imagination in searching for a purpose which would
uphold a statutory classification as constitutional and thereby avoid
the court imposing its political opinion of the state's "wisdom." 17
In equal protection questions the Supreme Court now appears to
prefer deferring to decisions made by Congress or state legislatures.18
Applying the traditional equal protection standard, it is only when
the Court cannot conceive of any set of facts to justify a statutory
discrimination that a statute is declared unconstitutional.9
The rationale which the Court presented to support the statutory
distinction in Belcher was that: (1) disability insurance and work-
men's compensation sometimes serve a common purpose; (2) Con-
gress decided that workmen's compensation should take precedence
in those instances of overlap where total payments exceed the policy
recommendation; (3) permitting duplication of payments would re-
sult in disabled persons receiving an income greater than that earned
17. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rzv. 1065,
1080 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
18. The Dandridge decision upheld a Maryland maximum welfare grant regu-
lation, with the majority stating that "[c]onflicting claims of morality and intelli-
gence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure .... But
the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by
public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court." 397 U.S.
at 487. The Supreme Court appears to espouse the view that active equal pro-
tection review is appropriate only in legislation which affects Bill of Rights free-
doms or "is infected with a racially discriminatory purpose or effect such as to
make it inherently suspect." Id. at 484, 485 n.17.
19. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). See also The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 HAmv. L. REv. 32, 62 & n.13 (1970). Accord, Carmichael
v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937):
[A legislature] may make distinctions of degree having a rational basis, and
when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be presumed to rest on that
basis if there is any conceivable state of facts which would support it.
-. .This restriction upon the judicial function, in passing on the constitu-
tionality of statutes, is not artificial or irrational. A state legislature, in the
enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the limits of the
Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue
of the considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence
of such a record courts cannot assume that its action is capricious or that,
with its informed acquaintance with local conditions to which the fegislation
is to be applied, it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for
its action. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial
review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its
rightful independence and its ability to function.
Id. at 509-10.
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before their disability arose, thereby impeding "rehabilitation" and
the effort to get workers back to their jobs; and (4) the duplication
would also cause employers (who pay part of the premiums for both
workmen's compensation and Social Security) to become dissatisfied
with disability programs, leading to the weakening of state programs
-and that would be contrary to the Congressional policy of encourag-
ing state workmen's compensation.2 0
Even applying the Court's rationality standard, the dissenting
opinion of Justices Marshall and Brennan stated that "[t]here simply
is no reasonable basis for singling out recipients of workmen's com-
pensation for a reduction of federal benefits, while those who receive
other kinds of disability compensation are not similarly treated."21
Justice Douglas, in dissent, applied the same Dandridge rationality
standard and found the statutory classification unconstitutional for
unjustifiably imposing "special treatment" on workmen's compensa-
tion beneficiaries while not affecting others similarly situated.22
If the purpose of the Social Security offset contested in Belcher is
to encourage "rehabilitation" by the economic duress of reducing
one's income below that which he would receive from working so as
to encourage him to go back to work, the statute is underinclusive-
by its terms it does not apply to all persons similarly situated. The
offset operates upon the Social Security benefits of workmen's com-
pensation beneficiaries but not upon the benefits of persons com-
parably disabled but receiving damage awards or insurance proceeds.
An all-inclusive statute for "rehabilitative" purposes would reduce
Social Security payments of all recipients to the extent that their
federal benefits plus income received due to disability from any other
source exceeded policy level. Justice Marshall's dissents in Dandridge
and Belcher would not tolerate underinclusion despite the existence
of arguments that a gradual approach is necessary in administrative
experiments. 23 When individuals are similarly situated they should
be treated similarly.2 4 An underinclusive statute is questionable
20. 404 U.S. at 82-83.
21. 404 U.S. at 91 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
22. Id. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23. Developments at 1086.
24. "[A] statutory discrimination must be based on differences that are
reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found." Morey
v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957). Consequently, the state may not, in the
provision of important services or the distribution of governmental payments,
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under democratic principles since it may burden a minority which
would not be affected if a comprehensive statute, affecting a larger
portion of the population, were required by the courts but could not
be enacted due to its political unpopularity.25
Under the traditional standard, the equal protection clause is not
violated even if the statutory classification is underinclusive. The
Dandridge Court stated that the judiciary should not impose its judg-
ment in areas of social and economic regulation, even though the
classification may be imperfect. 26 Experimentation by the legislature
and the necessity of a step-by-step approach in dealing with a com-
plex problem are justifications for underinclusive statutes.27
Equal protection standards of review should differ, according to
Marshall. Rationality is an appropriate standard of review for regu-
lation of business interests since business lobbies affect those formu-
lations, but a more subjective analysis is the proper norm in review-
ing statutes, such as that in Dandridge, affecting "the literally vital
interests of a powerless minority."28 A traditional legal analyst would
question what interests are within the "vital" category; a traditional
political analyst would dispute that a minority is disenfranchised;
and Justice Marshall would respond with Warren Court decisions of
a bygone era upholding more extensive active review.2D In contrast to
Marshall, the Belcher majority could find no reason for reviewing
welfare cases with a more rigorous standard than that applied to
other matters.3 0
When a legislature adopts a statute which is ostensibly the mandate
of its constituency, a court arguably should not declare the statute
unconstitutional simply because the court politically or theoretically
disagrees with the legislature as to the propriety of the enactment.
Despite that gap in Marshall's advocacy of active judicial review, his
supply benefits to some individuals while denying them to others who are
similarly situated. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 397 U.S. 471, 519 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting). But see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
25. Developments at 1086.
26. 397 U.S. at 485.
27. Developments at 1085.
28. 397 U.S. at 520 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). See note 16 supra
and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., cases cited in 397 U.S. at 521 & n.15 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting). See generally Developments at 1087-1132.
30. 404 U.S. at 81.
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concern is well-founded when he argues that the offset provision had
an erratic legislative history of enactment in 1956, 31 repeal in 1958,32
then perhaps poor consideration before the 1965 reenactment. 33 Can
a court which utilizes restrained review evaluate a statute more
strictly when it may have been inadequately deliberated by Congress?
When a statute involves the interests of a small minority-4 in opposi-
tion to business organizations, 35 can the court give extra attention to
the less established position in an effort to be "fair"? The answers of
the Dandridge and Belcher courts would be no-the court should
neither impose its political opinion on a statute nor police the pro-
cedures under which Congress chooses to operate; a political decision
is most appropriately made in the politically representative branch
of government under established methods.
A less contested query in Belcher was whether Social Security bene-
fits are vested property rights of a constitutional magnitude or merely
statutory gratuities established (and therefore revocable) by Con-
gress. Flemming v. Nestor", involved a similar question. Nestor
immigrated in 1913, became eligible for Social Security old-age bene-
fits in 1955, but was deported in 195637 for having been a member of
the Communist Party between 1933 and 1939. As a result of Nestor's
31. Social Security Amendments of 1956 § 103(a), 70 Stat. 815 (1956).
32. Social Security Amendments of 1958 § 206, 72 Stat. 1025 (1958).
33. Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 335, 42 U.S.C. § 424(a) (1970).
The legislative history of the Social Security offset was discussed in Lofty v.
Richardson, 440 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1971) and included a portion of the testi-
mony of Secretary Celebrezze of the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare which suggested that Congress study the question further before acting on it.
The suggestion was disregarded. Id. at 1150.
34. In his dissent to Belcher, Justice Douglas revealed that only 1.4% of all
Social Security disability beneficiaries also receive workmen's compensation pay-
ments. 404 U.S. at 86-87 & n.6 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35. "[E]mployer advocates of the offset amendment outweighed their opponents
in numbers of spokesmen and of exhibits tendered" at the 1965 hearings. 440
F.2d at 1150. Also opposed generally to federal disability coverage is the state
insurance industry; approximately 80% of state workmen's compensation business
(as indicated by amount of net premiums) is handled by private carriers, leading
to their encouraging a strong state program with minimal federal influence. P.
BRINKER, ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND SOCIAL SECURITY 174, table 8-3 (1968).
36. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
37. Deportation was pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act §
241(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1970).
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deportation, Social Security Act section 202 (n) 31 operated to termi-
nate his old-age benefits. Justice Harlan spoke for the majority of the
Court and emphasized that an individual's Social Security benefits are
not substantive contractual interests. Although eligibility for the pro-
gram may arise from extensive contributions, benefits
are not dependent on the degree to which [one] was called upon
to support the system by taxation. It is apparent that the non-
contractual interest of an employee covered by the Act cannot
soundly be analogized to that of the holder of an annuity, whose
right to benefits is bottomed on his contractual premium pay-
ments.
To engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of
"accrued property rights" would deprive it of the flexibility and
boldness in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it
demands.39
A legal right is enforceable through constitutional authority or
legislative directive. A constitutional right is inalterable by the
legislature, while statutory rights may be revised or repealed by a sub-
sequent statute.40 Much of the confusion as to the legal status of
Social Security benefits is due to the many similarities between pri-
vate contract insurance and the government program, although sig-
nificant differences also exist.4 1 Proponents of Social Security as a
constitutional right emphasize the contributory nature of the pro-
gram, seeking to establish it as a contract, thereby according it prop-
erty status and fifth amendment protection against taking without
just compensation:
No form of government largess . . . is more clearly earned by
the recipient, who, together with his employer, contributes to the
Social Security fund during the years of his employment. No
38. Social Security Act § 202(n), 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1970). The statute
provides for termination of benefits to one who is deported on grounds there
specified after September 1, 1954 under the Immigration and Nationality Act §
241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1970).
39. 363 U.S. at 609-10.
40. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576-77 (1934). See R. CLARX,
ECONOMIC SECURITY FOR THE AGED IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 38
(1959); W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS
548-49 (1970); W. MYER, VESTED PIGHTS 96 (1891).
41. R. CLARx, supra note 40, at 25-47.
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form is more obviously a compulsory substitute for private prop-
erty; the tax on wage earner and employer might readily have
gone to higher pay and higher private savings instead. No form
is more relied on, and more often thought of as property.42
However, severe problems exist in the contract argument. Since
Congress established the Social Security program, it may modify or
abandon it at will.43 A contract would be binding in its terms on
future generations regarding the distribution of the national income,
and would preclude flexibility and experimentation.-
Ten years after the Nestor decision announced that Social Security
benefits were not property rights, the Supreme Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly45 reviewed the constitutionality of cancelling welfare benefits
without a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. Kelly continued the
trend toward denying certain distinctions between "rights" and
"privileges"46 by mandating procedural safeguards to public assist-
ance recipients whose eligibility is disputed. Since "due process"
protection is extended by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
challenges to "property," the Supreme Court might conceivably be
42. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 769 (1964).
43. E.g., Kurz v. Celebrezze, 225 F. Supp. 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (right to
benefits arises by statute, not by equity); Price v. Folsom, 168 F. Supp. 392
(D.N.J. 1959) (a person only has a right to Social Security payments to the ex-
tent that such right is supported by provisions of the statute and where there is
strict adherence to the conditions of the Social Security law).
44. Wallenberg, Vested Rights in Social Security Benefits, 37 ORE. L. Rv.
299, 359 (1958). In the old-age insurance context of Social Security, where a
contract might also be contended, Congress dealt specifically with the question of
a right to payment. The original Social Security Act provided for a lump sum
in the nature of a refund to those individuals who contributed to the system but
were ultimately ineligible for benefits. The government's old-age program was
initially based upon the model of private pensions in which the participant ac-
quired a definite contractual right. The 1939 amendments to the Social Security
Act abolished the lump sum payments, effectively eliminating the pension concept.
Despite some employees having contributed Social Security taxes and ultimately
not qualifying for either benefits or a return of their tax money, "[tfhousands of
individuals have qualified for OASDI [Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insur-
ance] benefits on the basis of earnings records where no social-security taxes were
paid and even where no tax liability was incurred. The OASDI benefit must,
therefore, be considered a gratuity." Id. at 302-03, 312-13.
45. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
46. See K. DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 126-45 (1959); The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. Rlv. 1, 103 (1970); Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAsv. L. REv. 1439,
1454 (1968).
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regarded as having recognized benefit-entitlements as property rights
by according recipients procedural rights in the benefit review process.
The Court did suggest, in a footnote, that the time may have come to
recognize qualification for welfare benefits as being more like a prop-
erty right than a governmental gratuity.47
Soon after the Kelly decision, a United States district court re-
viewed Raymond Belcher's prayer for relief from the Social Security
offset provision in Belcher v. Richardson.4s Hypothesizing a Supreme
Court doctrinal reversal of Nestor by Kelly,49 the lower court con-
strued Kelly as tending "to elevate entitlement to welfare to the status
of a property right . . .0
The Supreme Court in Richardson v. Belcher, however, explicitly
declined to extend the Kelly decision beyond its holding as to
requisite procedures, leaving the substantive question of legal entitle-
ments to Congress. 51 Writing for the Belcher majority, Justice
Stewart briefly dismissed the property argument by a reference to
Nestor and a cursory denial that either contribution to the Social
Security program or expectation of benefits would vest a participant
with an enforcible contractual interest. In dissent, Justices Marshall
and Brennan considered Social Security payments to be an annuity or
insurance benefit, therefore a contractual obligation.52 The consist-
ency and near unanimity of the Supreme Court in deciding against
the notion that Social Security is property and the soundness of the
Nestor rationale under traditional principles preclude recognition of
47. 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
48. 317 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1970).
49. In Nestor, the applicant had contributed to the Social Security fund from
which he sought benefit, but no property right was found. Conversely, in Kelly an
applicant who had not contributed to the welfare funds which she sought was
tacitly recognized as having a limited "property right" when the Court mandated
that procedural safeguards are necessary in the termination of welfare benefits.
317 F. Supp. at 1299. Less superficially, however, it is apparent that the cases
involved different issues: Nestor was an unsuccessful substantive contention that
Social Security is property, while Kelly was a declaration of procedural standards,
disregarding "right-privilege" differences.
50. 317 F. Supp. at 1297.
51. 404 U.S. at 81.
52. Id. at 96 n.10 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Justice Black took
this dissenting position in Nestor: "[Terminating benefits to one deported for past
Communist affiliation,] it seems to me, takes [one's] insurance without just com-
pensation and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
363 U.S. at 622 (Black, J., dissenting).
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public assistance as a matter of constitutional right, even when an
individual has contributed substantial sums in expectation of a re-
turn.
The significance of Richardson v. Belcher is largely that it con-
tinues the recent trend of the Supreme Court in equal protection
questions toward markedly less stringent review. For the Court to
acquiesce in extensive Congressional discretion may be an abdication
of judicial responsibility to thoroughly scrutinize acts of Congress for
inconsistencies or it may be an affirmation of the theory that Congress
is the more appropriate body for making policy decisions. The
Supreme Court in Belcher reviewed the disputed offset statute and
found it basically rational and devoid of invidious discrimination.
When a reduction of Social Security benefits is imposed on only one
class of recipients, however, one might question whether Congress has
slighted fairness and similar treatment in the exercise of its broad pre-
rogatives. The Court's perception of its "limited function under the
Constitution" 3 required that it review the statute only for rationality
and invidiousness. Other courts-and surely the Belcher dissenters-
with a different judicial philosophy, would have actively reviewed the
offset and would have declared the provision unconstitutional. The
inconsistency has been exposed to Congress, and further action is
incumbent upon it.
William F. Greer, Jr.
53. 404 U.S. at 84.
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